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We construct a static computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to quantify the endogenous 
productivity spillovers from foreign-invested firms to domestic firms, taking the Chinese economy as 
a case study. The coefficients of four spillover channels are estimated from econometric analysis. The 
simulations are conducted under two alternative market structures, namely perfect competition and 
monopolistic competition. Simulation results indicate that the spillover premia are positive in terms of 
national total output, GDP and welfare. The spillover effect is more prominent when the market 
structure is relatively monopolistic. FDI spillovers can also result in more product varieties produced 
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From the host country perspective, productivity spillovers to domestic firms are arguably one of the 
most important benefits from foreign direct investment (FDI), and many developing countries have 
adopted preferential FDI policies, characterized as “swapping domestic market access for advanced 
foreign technology and productivity”, in pursuit of such spillovers. But productivity spillovers can take 
place through several channels, and, most significantly, need not be confined to the industry or sector 
in which the FDI itself occurs. Measuring the effects of FDI productivity spillovers as economy-wide and 
cross-industry (as opposed to sector-specific) phenomena, requires a general equilibrium framework, 
for which computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling is an obvious candidate. To date there have 
been only a handful of papers modelling FDI productivity spillovers using CGE, and their parameters 
were drawn from the general literature and not specifically related to the economies in question. This 
research aims overcome this weakness by combining CGE and econometric techniques to quantify FDI 
productivity spillovers and to simulate their effects. 
China is an obvious economy for such a study. Since 1993, China has been the largest FDI host 
among the developing countries. FDI has been sought for the potential spillovers it can provide, and 
FDI inflows have been large enough to have had a measurable impact. As an economy in transition, 
firms in China fall into three ownership types – state-owned enterprises (SOEs), domestic privately-
owned private enterprises (Private) and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). This naturally raises the 
question of whether FDI-induced productivity spillovers benefit both domestic ownership types, and if 
so, whether they benefit both types equally. In our benchmark, competitive model it is the spillovers that 
ensure an increase in the output of domestic firms following an FDI shock. SOEs have the larger output 
increase overall, but Private enterprises have the larger output increase from the spillovers themselves. 
In addition to the standard competitive analysis, we also explore FDI spillovers under the alternative 
market structure of monopolistic competition. This recognizes that in the modern theory of the 
multinational enterprise, FDI occurs when firms exploit ownership-specific advantages in imperfectly 
competitive markets. It also introduces a further margin of adjustment as productivity spillovers can 
result in either larger domestic firms, or more domestic firms, and hence an increase in the range of 
products available to consumers, or a combination of both. Our simulations show that the lower the 
degree of competition assumed in the benchmark equilibrium, the larger the competitive benefits from 
the FDI spillovers. The representative state-owned and private enterprises are larger, but they are 
fewer in number as a consequence of the FDI shock, both with and without the spillovers. But the 
spillovers themselves tend to increase both equilibrium firm size and numbers, particularly the numbers 
of Private enterprises. Whatever the market structure assumed, the spillovers are clearly important for 








Foreign direct investment (FDI) plays an increasingly significant role in the global 
economic system, especially for the emerging economies. From the host country 
perspective, productivity spillovers to domestic firms are arguably one of the most 
important benefits from FDI, and many developing countries have adopted preferential FDI 
policies, characterized as “swapping domestic market access for advanced foreign 
technology and productivity” (Long, 2005), in pursuit of such spillovers. Since the 1990s, 
there has been a rich emerging literature, both theoretical and empirical, exploring FDI 
productivity spillovers and their effects.   
But productivity spillovers can take place through several channels, and, most 
significantly, need not be confined to the industry or sector in which the FDI itself occurs.
1 
Measuring the effects of FDI productivity spillovers as economy-wide and cross-industry 
(as opposed to sector-specific) phenomena, requires a general equilibrium framework, for 
which computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling is an obvious candidate. To date 
there have been only a handful of papers modelling FDI productivity spillovers using CGE. 
Gillespie et al. (2002) take FDI spillovers as an exogenous externality, while Lejour et al. 
(2008) allow the magnitude of the spillover to vary with the size of FDI. But both studies 
make analysis with parameters drawn from the literature and the parameters are not 
specifically related to the economies in question. This research aims overcome this 
weakness by combining CGE and econometric techniques to quantify FDI productivity 
spillovers and to simulate their effects.   
We chose the Chinese economy, for two main reasons. First, China has become an 
attractive FDI destination during the past three decades of “reform and opening-up (Deng et 
al., 2007). Since 1993, China has been the largest FDI host among the developing countries. 
FDI has been sought for the potential spillovers it can provide, and FDI inflows have been 
large enough to have had a measurable impact. Second, as an economy in transition, firms 
in China fall into three ownership types – state-owned enterprises (SOEs), domestic 
privately-owned private enterprises (Private) and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs)
2. This 
                                                        
1 The channels are discussed in more detail in the next section. The main channel that we are unable to 
include is spillovers through labour movements between multinational affiliates and domestic firms. Some 
evidence on this channel is given in Blake et al. (2009). 
2 SOEs include enterprises with their largest share of registered capital invested by state agencies. FIEs 
include enterprises registered as joint-venture, cooperative, sole (exclusive) investment enterprises or limited 
liability corporations with funds from outside the China Mainland. Private enterprises include all types of  2
naturally raises the question of whether FDI-induced productivity spillovers benefit both 
domestic ownership types, and if so, whether they benefit both types equally. Our 
simulation results show that both SOEs and Private enterprises can benefit from these 
spillovers, but that Private enterprises benefit more. 
In addition to the standard competitive analysis, we also explore FDI spillovers under 
the alternative market structure of monopolistic competition. This recognizes that in the 
modern theory of the multinational enterprise, FDI occurs when firms exploit 
ownership-specific advantages in imperfectly competitive markets (Markusen, 2002). It 
also introduces a further margin of adjustment as productivity spillovers can result in either 
larger domestic firms, or more domestic firms, and hence an increase in the range of 
products available to consumers, or a combination of both. Monopolistic competition has 
been applied widely in the CGE analysis of trade liberalization (e.g. Harrison et al., 1994, 
1995, 1997, Francois and Roland-Holst, 1997, Blake et al., 1999), but has yet to be applied 
to the analysis of FDI productivity spillovers. Our results suggest that the type of 
competition matters and that the lower the degree of competition in the benchmark, the 
higher the competitive benefits from the FDI spillovers.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses the 
spillover channels that we consider. Section 3 then outlines the CGE framework under both 
perfect and monopolistic competition, and describes the data that we employ. Section 4 
introduces our decomposition of total factor productivity and our model of productivity 
spillovers. The spillover parameters are then estimated econometrically. Section 5 presents 
the simulation results of FDI shocks under the two alternative market structures. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. The channels of productivity spillovers 
In this section we briefly review the theoretical and empirical literature on the channels 
through which productivity may spill over from foreign affiliates to local firms through 
product markets. 
2.1. Vertical input-output linkages 
MNE’s affiliates may provide their domestic suppliers and customers with technical 
assistance and training in management and organization (Markusen and Venables, 1999, 
Javorcik, 2004, Girma and Gong, 2008, Girma et al., 2008). Backward linkages arise when 
                                                                                                                                                                         
enterprises other than SOEs and FIEs.  3
affiliates in downstream sectors source from upstream domestic firms. Sourcing locally can 
reduce affiliates’ production costs and can trigger competition among upstream domestic 
firms. Multinationals’ high technical requirements for their intermediate inputs often 
necessitating a transfer of technology to their upstream domestic suppliers (Javorcik, 2004). 
Domestic firms in downstream sectors can also benefit from the improved intermediate 
products supplied by domestic suppliers, and this benefit may outweigh the competition 
effect which multinational firms impose on domestic firms in upstream sectors. Similarly, 
forward linkages promote the transfer of knowledge from multinational affiliates in 
upstream sectors to downstream indigenous firms. This allows domestic firms to improve 
their productivity by purchasing high-quality intermediate products from multinational 
firms
3. 
2.2. Exports of MNE affiliates 
To export involves sunk costs incurred for market research, advertisement, establishing 
distribution networks etc. Firm level data confirms that entry into exporting is a 
self-selection process in which only the more productive firms become exporters (Clerides 
et al., 1998, Melitz, 2003). But even when domestic firms are productive enough to enter 
export markets, they may be unfamiliar with overseas markets and foreign consumers may 
be unfamiliar with Chinese products. The presence of large multinationals with well 
established international trade networks and extensive knowledge of international markets, 
can reduce the information barriers facing both domestic firms and foreign consumers 
(Aitken et al., 1997, Greenaway and Kneller, 2008, Lawless, 2009). Even if domestic firms 
do not currently find exporting profitable, the success of multinational firms in international 
markets can stimulate domestic firms to improve their productivity and product quality to 
meet international standards so as to emulate them (Alvarez and López, 2005). FDI from 
the East Asian economies has transferred labour-intensive, export-oriented assembly to the 
coastal provinces in China (Deng et al., 2007), and the export of FIEs accounts for more 
than 50% of China’s total export volume in the last ten years.   
2.3. Horizontal effects: demonstration and competition 
Demonstration is probably the “most evident” spillover channel (Crespo and Fontoura, 
2007, pp. 411), particularly in economies which are transforming quickly from a 
centrally-planning economy, dominated by SOEs, into a market economy with a variety of 
                                                        
3  Similar spillover effects via forward linkages in international trade have been widely acknowledged in 
the literature (e.g. Falvey et al., 2004, Keller, 2004).  4
ownerships. FIEs with technological and managerial advantages showcase their superior 
practices in production, management, and services to their domestic counterparts, who can 
at least partially imitate them through “reverse engineering” (Das, 1987). The increased 
competition created by the entry of MNEs intensifies the competition for resources in host 
countries and constrains the market power of domestic firms forcing them to make more 
efficient use of existing resources.   
3. The CGE framework 
3.1. A benchmark CGE model under perfect competition 
Our approach to calculating the productivity spillover effects of FDI involves estimating 
FDI productivity spillover coefficients and then implementing simulations of FDI shocks in 
a CGE model. This static, single-country CGE model contains 93 industrial sectors (mining, 
manufacturing, and utilities, MMU) and 8 non-industrial sectors (agriculture and services). 
The representative consumer has a nested consumption structure, each level of which is 
represented by a CES function, as shown in Figure 1. 
======Figure 1 about here====== 
The lowest level (level 4) aggregates commodities across firms in the same industry 
with the same ownership type, e.g. the products of SOEs in the textile industry. In the right 
panel of Figure 1, the eight sectors in agriculture and services do not contain information on 
ownership, so they are exempted from the level 4 aggregation. At the second lowest level 
(level 3) commodities are further aggregated across the three ownership types. Level 2 is an 
Armington aggregation over domestically produced and imported commodities, and the top 
level, aggregates the products of all sectors. 
3.2. CGE extension under monopolistic competition 
The CGE model constructed above assumes that the Chinese economy has perfectly 
competitive markets. As noted above, however, it is recognised that FDI is undertaken to 
exploit firm-specific advantages in an imperfectly competitive environment. Monopolistic 
competition refers to an industry structure where a relatively large group of firms produce 
different varieties of a particular product. Each firm has monopoly power over its own 
variety, and in the long run there are no entry barriers. Since China is a large market and our 
industries are still aggregates of a large number of products, monopolistic competition 
seems to be an appropriate imperfectly competitive market structure.   
The potential impact of FDI productivity spillovers in a scenario of monopolistic  5
competition can be illustrated by a variety-scale diagram (Francois and Roland-Holst, 1997, 
pp. 349). The number of varieties (“N”) and production scale per variety (“Q”) of the 
representative firm are shown on the vertical and horizontal axes, respectively in Figure 2. 
Locus A0A0 depicts the “variety-scale possibility frontier” and represents the pre-spillover 
trade-off between variety and scale given the resources available to the representative firm. 
FDI-productivity spillovers then increase the production capacity of this sector (given these 
resources) from A0A0 to A1A1, which allows expansion in both the scale and variety 
dimensions.  
======Figure 2 about here====== 
The potential outcomes can be illustrated algebraically using a standard model 
(Krugman, 1980). Suppose production requires a composite factor input, with the 
representative firm’s input requirements given by x=f+vQ, where f and v denote fixed cost 
and variable cost measured in units of the composite factor input, respectively, and Q is 
firm output (value added). Then if p and w denote the prices of the output and input, 
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We now examine how FDI productivity spillovers may affect this solution. The 
spillovers affect the industry’s resource constraint by reducing fixed and variable costs. A 
reduction in fixed costs increases the number of firms and reduces the output of the 
representative firm in the same proportion. A reduction in variable costs leaves the number 
of firms unchanged but increases firm size. If both costs fall in the same proportion, then 
firm size is unchanged but the number of firms increases. A typical outcome is shown by 
the shift from the initial production point E0(Q, N) to a new equilibrium point  1(, ) EQN ′′  
in Figure 2. Under monopolistic competition, productivity spillovers from foreign-invested  6
firms can bring consumers welfare improvement through more varieties at lower prices. 
Only the price benefits may be available if goods are homogeneous and markets are 
perfectly competitive. 
3.3. Data 
Our CGE model is based on a transformation of the Chinese input-output table for 2002. 
The transformation involves two main steps. First, we aggregate the original 122 by 122 
input-output table into a 39 by 39 table (see Table 1 for the list of aggregated industries), as 
data on FDI inflows are only available for those 39 aggregate industries. Second, we use 
data estimated for FIE, SOE, and Private enterprises (see Table 2), to disaggregate 31 of 
these 39 industries into 31*3=93 ownership-type sectors following a similar strategy to 
Gillespie et al (2001, 2002)
4. The final product is a 93+8=101 dimension input-output table, 
which allows us to examine productivity spillovers from FIEs to SOEs and Private 
enterprises. The data employed are mainly from China Input-Output Table (hereafter “I/O”), 
China Statistical Yearbook and China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook (hereafter 
“CIESY”) for 2002, all of which were published by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (hereafter "NBS", 2003a, , 2003b, , 2006) 
======Tables 1 and 2 about here====== 
4. Incorporation of endogenous FDI spillovers 
4.1. Productivity spillovers 
The benchmark CGE model can be extended to incorporate our four productivity spillover 
channels. We begin by writing value added in industry i at time t (VAi,t) as the product of 
industry total factor productivity at time t (TFPi,t) and Cobb-Douglas function of capital 
(Ki,t) and labour (Li,t) inputs. Thus   
VAi,t=TFPi,t×
L K
t i t i L K
α α
, ,                    ( 1 )  
Then  TFP can in turn be decomposed into TFP = TFPindigenous + TFPspillover where 
TFPindigenous captures the indigenous factors that contribute to TFP (e.g. R&D, employee 
education and skills, and management skills), while TFPspillover measures the FDI 
                                                        
4 Firstly, data from China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, was used to estimate the ratios of 
output and value added by ownership to total output and total value added in each sector. Secondly, we 
multiplied these ratios with the corresponding flows of intermediate output and value added of each sector to 
disaggregate the latter. Thirdly, we adjusted final demands, intermediate input, and error terms to construct a 
balanced ownership-disaggregated input-output table. Full details of this aggregation-disaggregation data 
compilation are available in Deng (2009).  7
productivity spillover effects. We assume that TFPindigenous is unchanged in our simulations. 
Estimation then takes place in two stages
5: 
ln(VAi,t)=α0 + αKlnKi,t + αLlnLi,t + εi,t           ( 2 )  
TFPi,t = exp(α0 + εi,t) = α1 + β*SPLi,t +ζi , t           (3) 
where vector SPL includes our four FDI spillover channel variables calculated as follows: 
(1) the horizontal demonstration effect, HZDSi,t, is the share of FIEs in the gross output in 
sector j at time t; (2) backward linkages BLi,t, and forward linkages FLi,t, are designed to 
capture local firm interactions with FIEs as purchasers and suppliers, respectively. The 
specifications follow Javorcik (2004): 
∑ ∗ =
k
k k j j HZDS BL , γ               ( 4 )  
∑ ∗ =
k
k j k j HZDS FL , η               ( 5 )  
where γj,k is the proportion of sector j’s output supplied to sector k ( 1 , = ∑
k
k j γ ); and ηk,j is 
the proportion of sector k’s output supplied to sector j ( 1 , = ∑
k
j k η )
6. These are taken from 
the Input-Output Table of China for 2002; (3) the “export concentration”. EXCOi is the ratio 
of the exports of FIEs in sector i to total exports in that sector.   
Equations (2) and (3) are estimated using industry-level panel data. As Görg and 
Strobl (2001) note, panel data analyses are superior to cross-sectional studies in their 
capability of capturing time-invariant sector-specific factors which may impact on the 
relationship between foreign presence and the performance of domestic enterprises. 
Ignoring such time-invariant factors usually leads to an overestimation of FDI productivity 











NTFP                 ( 6 )  
where  t i t i t i t i EXCO HZDS FL BL , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ β β β β + + + ≡ × SPL β . 
In the CGE modelling, the share of FIEs in sectoral output (HZDSi) and the share of 
FIEs in sectoral exports (EXCOi) are both endogenously determined in counterfactual 
                                                        
5  Data limitations imply that we estimate common capital and labour shares for all industries of the same 
ownership type. Ideally we would accommodate differences in human capital across industries and ownership 
types, but data on employee schooling is not available by ownership sector. Similarly we are unable to include 
industry or year dummies because of limited observations (for Private enterprises in particular).   
6 For example, assume FIEs’ output shares in industry 1, 2, 3 are 10%, 20%, and 30%, respectively. 
Industry 1 provides its products to itself, industry 2 and 3 with proportion of 40%, 35% and 25%. Then 
coefficient of backward linkage is BL = 40%×10% + 20%×35% + 30%×25% = 0.185.  8
experiments. Backward linkages (BLi) and forward linkages (FLi) are also endogenously 
determined by (4) and (5), respectively. The share of productivity spillovers is then also 
endogenous, as specified by (6). The changes in these variables in the simulations are 
discussed in Section 5.2 (Tables 9 and 10). We can transform equation (1) into 











= Θ ,  i TFP0  denotes the benchmark TFP in sector i. In the benchmark 
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4.2. Econometric estimation of spillover parameters 
Our data sources for the econometric analysis are summarised in Table 3. The CGE model 
is built on the I/O Table for 2002, which is also employed to calculate the input-output 
coefficients (γj,k and ηk,j) for the spillover channels. For compatibility the FDI spillover 
parameters β should be estimated for the years around 2002, and the available CIESYs are 
for 2001-2003 and 2005-2006. This gives us 155 (panel data) observations for SOEs (31 
industries and 5 years), but the data for Private enterprises are only available in 2005 and 
2006, giving only 62 total observations.   
======Table 3 about here====== 
Tables 4 and 5 report the econometric estimation of value added and spillovers, 
respectively. The value added estimations in Table 4 show significant differences in the 
factor shares between private and state-owned enterprises, with the former having the 
higher labour cost share. The estimates in Table 5 show significant positive spillovers 
through forward linkages and horizontal demonstration effects, with higher coefficients 
estimated for Private firms. There appear to be no significant backward linkages, and a 
higher concentration of foreign firms in exports appears to have no effect on SOEs, but a 
significant negative impact on Private firms. It is difficult to make sense of this as a 
“negative spillover”, and what it may simply be indicating is that Private enterprises tend, 
for other reasons, to have low TFP in those industries in which FIEs have a larger share of 
exports.
7 Unfortunately data limitations, particularly for Private enterprises, do not allow 
us to estimate the industry fixed effects that might settle this issue. For this reason we retain 
all the spillover channels in the simulation analysis, while recognising that our results are at 
least partly contaminated by non-spillover effects. 
                                                        
7  Although it has been suggested that export-oriented FIEs may “cherry pick” skilled workers from their 
domestic rivals reducing the productivity of the latter (Girma and Gong, 2008).  9
======Table 4 and 5 about here====== 
5. CGE simulations and results 
5.1. FDI shocks 
The FDI shock that is introduced into the model is an increase of the capital stock in each 
foreign-invested sector corresponding to the actual FDI inflow in 2003. As Table 1 shows, 
FDI into the manufacturing sectors accounted for almost 70% of total FDI in 2003. The five 
main manufacturing recipients are highlighted in bold. The aggregate effects of this FDI 
shock, with and without spillovers, are shown in Table 6. Aggregate output increases by 
5.9% without spillovers and 6.8% with. The largest increase in output is by FIEs in each 
case, and in fact the output of domestic enterprises falls by 1.9% (0.6% SOEs and 2.3% 
Private) in the absence of spillovers. But the output of both domestic ownership types 
increases once spillovers are taken into account. Table 7 shows how FDI affects the 
performance of enterprises of different ownerships in the top 5 FDI recipient sectors. The 
changes in output, value added, and exports are consistent with Table 6. 
======Table 6 and 7 about here====== 
The underlying process at work here, is that a capital inflow into FIEs in each sector, 
reduces the price of capital in FIEs and encourages a movement of capital into the other 
ownership types in that sector. Conversely the price of labour in FIEs increases, 
encouraging an inflow of labour from domestic enterprises into FIEs in each sector. The net 
result for the domestic enterprises depends on the relative ease of mobility of capital and 
labour across ownership types. The elasticity of transformation
8 of labour between 
ownerships is assumed to be lower (τL=0.5) than that of capital (τK=2) because 
inter-ownership labour mobility is still very low in China
9. As Table 7 shows, the prices of 
capital in all ownership types are pulled down by the FDI influx, while the prices of labour 
in foreign-invested sectors rise significantly. However, the low transformability of labour 
between FIEs and domestic enterprises, implies that the contraction of the domestic sectors 
will lead to a reduced demand for and lower price of labour there. 
To test the sensitivity of these results to the transformation parameters, we rerun the 
                                                        
8 We use “transformation” rather than “substitution” because the supplies of primary inputs (labour and 
capital) are disaggregated to each ownership-type sector with a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
function. 
9 According to a recent survey of 1,500 firms conducted by Asia Market Intelligence, only about 0.2% 
of the employees had work experience in foreign-invested enterprises in 2000. Knight and Yueh (2004) also 
argue that the inter-firm labour mobility in urban areas in China is still very low.  10
experiments allowing the elasticities of capital and labour transformation to take 10 
alternative values (0.1, 0.4, 0.7, …, 2.8).
10  Table 8 reports the changes in national output - 
without spillovers in the upper block, with spillovers in the middle block and the 
differences between them (the spillover premia) in the lower block - for each of these 
experiments. The numbers themselves will be discussed below
11. In each case, the output 
increase is larger the larger the elasticity of transformation of labour, for any given 
elasticity of transformation of capital. While the output increase is smaller the larger the 
elasticity of transformation of capital, for any given elasticity of transformation of labour. 
In the current context of an FDI inflow, while a higher elasticity of capital transformation 
leads to a greater capital outflow from FIEs to domestic enterprises, a higher elasticity of 
labour transformation leads to a greater labour outflow from domestic enterprises to FIEs. 
The implications for total output reflect the higher TFP in FIEs.   
======Table 8 about here====== 
5.2. FDI shocks with spillovers under perfect competition 
The spillover premia in Table 8 also increase with labour transformability and decline with 
capital transformability, for a given degree of transformability of the other factor. But the 
latter effect is greater than the former, implying a net decline as we move down the main 
diagonal.  
======Figure 3 about here====== 
Figure 3 illustrates the corresponding effects (including spillovers) on total output and 
aggregate outputs for each of the ownership types. Panels (b) and (c) exhibit a similar 
pattern. If the transformability of labour between foreign firms and domestic firms is 
relatively high, FDI shocks can attract labour from domestic firms, making the total output 
of the latter decrease. But if the transformability of capital between foreign firms and 
domestic firms is relatively high, then domestic enterprises can benefit more from the 
influx of FDI. Panel (d) shows the corresponding changes for FIEs. Panel (a) implies that 
the positive impact of FDI shocks on FIEs outweighs any negative impact on the domestic 
firms
12.  
                                                        
10 While elasticities of capital transformation as large as 4 are used in the literature (e.g. Lejour et al., 
2008, Springer, 1998), we view 2.8 as a reasonable upper limit given the idiosyncratic characteristics of 
foreign capital, state capital and private capital in the Chinese economy in transition. For symmetry we also 
set 2.8 as the upper limit for the elasticity of labour transformation, though we expect the actual value to be at 
the lower end of this range. 
11  The changes of GDP and national welfare are all positive and their patterns are very similar to that of 
national total output shown in Table 8. 
12 The changes in GDP and national welfare are all positive and their patterns are very similar to those  11
Tables 9 and 10 illustrate the percentage changes in variables relating to SOEs and 
Private enterprises, respectively, by sector, including spillovers. As discussed in Section 3.3, 
the changes in the spillover variables (i.e. HZDS, BL, FL and EXCO) will determine the 
changes in productivity of domestic firms. The contribution of FDI productivity spillovers 
to total productivity (NTFP), has increased for both SOEs and private firms in all 
industries
13. The change in the level of total productivity (TFP), is also positive in all 
industries. On average, SOEs have 9.6% NTFP improvement and 1.8% TFP improvement, 
while Private enterprises have 8.6% NTFP improvement and 3.6% TFP improvement. The 
four spillover channel variables (HZDS, BL, FL and EXCO) do not necessarily change in 
the same direction. The top five FDI recipient industries are marked in bold in the Tables, 
and are not necessarily among the top recipients of FDI productivity spillovers. Likewise 
the top FDI spillover recipients do not necessarily have the largest output increases. The 
spillover effects on exports and imports can be positive or negative, and product prices (P) 
are generally lower. The effects on output are also mixed, reflecting the fact that the FDI 
shock can bring both positive spillover effects and negative competition effects by 
attracting resources away from the domestic enterprises.   
======Table 9 and 10 about here====== 
The spillover premia shown in Table 8, are illustrated in Figure 4(a). Panels 4(b) and 
4(c) show how the positive premia which SOEs and Private enterprises obtain in aggregate 
from FDI productivity spillovers are related to the elasticities of transformation of capital 
and labour between enterprise types. A comparison of panels 4(b) and 4(c) suggests that 
Private enterprises obtain higher spillover premia than SOEs. The increase in FIEs’ output 
is lower than that without FDI productivity spillovers for any given combination of 
elasticities of transformation, i.e. a negative spillover premium as shown in panel 4(d). But 
the net outcome of the spillovers is a total output increase as shown in panel 4(a) 
======Figure 4 about here====== 
5.3. FDI shocks with spillovers under monopolistic competition 
Simulating the effects of FDI productivity spillovers under monopolistic competition 
involves all the channels considered above plus changes in variety (numbers of firms) and 
the scale of firm production. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
shown in panel (a) of Figure 3. 
13 For both SOEs and Private enterprises, the “production of tap water” gains the most (26.3% and 
40.7% respectively) from the FDI spillovers. This is probably because the initial FDI volume in this industry 
was relatively low, while an FDI shock (accounting for 0.5% of total FDI) to this industry can bring the 
largest increase in terms of the contribution rate of FDI spillovers in total TFP, as measured by equation (6).  12
(a) Changes of GDP, output and welfare 
The impacts of FDI productivity spillovers on aggregate variables for different initial 
degrees of monopolistic power are shown in Table 11. N denotes the initial number of firms 
and varieties, chosen for each ownership type in each industry in the benchmark economy. 
We also include the outcomes for perfect competition for comparison. As we can see, the 
weaker the level of competition the stronger the effects of an FDI shock (in absolute values), 
with or without FDI spillovers. The change in total output of domestic firms tends to be 
relatively stable across ownership types, with a positive spillover premium for both, but 
larger for Private enterprises (1.2%) than for SOEs (0.5%).   
(b) Changes of variety and scale 
FIEs expand in size and number with and without the spillovers, though the spillover 
premium reflects a small increase in scale and a reduction in numbers. Figure 5 is drawn to 
summarise how the FDI shocks with and without productivity spillovers affect the domestic 
sectors in our CGE model. Collectively, they shift from benchmark equilibrium E0 to either 
E1 or E2. As shown scale increases but the number of varieties falls for both ownership 
types, with and without the spillovers. But the total number of varieties in each sector 
increases thanks to more foreign-invested varieties. Panel 5(b) depicts how spillovers can 
affect these changes. The spillover premia on both variety and scale are positive, pushing 
A1A1 and A2A2 upwards, resulting in a new equilibrium at  1 E′ or  2 E′. The effects of the 
spillovers on scale are very similar for both ownership types, but there is a greater 
percentage increase in the number of Private enterprises. These spillovers negatively affect 
the number of varieties produced by foreign enterprises, however, as some of their 
resources are attracted away when domestic rivals become more productive.   
Though FDI spillovers can result in more product varieties produced by domestic 
enterprises, and can also help domestic enterprises increase their production scale for each 
product, the net result of the FDI shock will be fewer domestic varieties as the value of 
elasticity of transformation of capital falls and that of labour rises. The changes in key 
variables at industry-level under monopolistic competition are similar to those shown in 
Tables 9 and 10. The contribution of productivity spillovers in total TFP of domestic 
enterprises (NTFP) also increases, resulting in a moderate productivity (TFP) improvement. 
6. Concluding remarks 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study in the literature to endogenise FDI 
productivity spillovers by incorporating spillover channels within a CGE framework. In our  13
competitive model, we find that both state-owned and private enterprises benefit from FDI 
productivity spillovers. In our benchmark model it is the spillovers that ensure an increase 
in the output of domestic firms. SOEs have the larger output increase overall, but Private 
enterprises have the larger output increase from the spillovers themselves. This is also the 
first study exploring FDI spillovers under monopolistic competition. This allowed us to 
comment on the impact on representative domestic firms. The lower the degree of 
competition assumed in the benchmark equilibrium, the larger the competitive benefits 
from the FDI spillovers. The representative state-owned and private enterprises are larger, 
but they are fewer in number as a consequence of the FDI shock, both with and without the 
spillovers. But the spillovers themselves tend to increase both equilibrium firm size and 
numbers, particularly the numbers of Private enterprises. Whatever the market structure 
assumed, the spillovers are clearly important for FDI to yield benefits to domestic firms of 
both ownership types.   
This research can be extended in several dimensions. Its major weakness is that we 
were forced to rely on industry level data to estimate the parameters of the productivity 
spillover channels. Our spillover channels are potentially contaminated by industry specific 
effects which we could not control for. Better estimates will be obtained when firm-level 
data sets covering a wide range of industries and all three ownership types become 
available. Given the apparent significance of the degree of competition for the outcomes, 
extending the analysis to include monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms 
(Melitz, 2003) should also be fruitful. This relaxation of the assumption of a representative 
firm would allow the consideration of intra-industry resource reallocation towards those 
most productive enterprises. This can lead to potentially even more prominent FDI 
productivity spillover effects since the surviving foreign firms are more productive and thus 
more likely to generate spillovers, and because the surviving domestic firms are more 
capable of absorbing spillovers from FDI (Deng, 2009). This research can also be employed 
to simulate the effects of changes in the corporate income tax system. Countries have 
“increasingly” relied on policy incentives (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 2000, pp. 3) to attract FDI, partially allured by the potential for productivity 
spillovers. To check if the tax concessions made to foreign-invested firms, our model can 
examine whether FDI has generated compensating benefits through productivity spillovers.   
     14
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Figure 1. Consumption aggregation. 
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Figure 2. FDI productivity spillovers under monopolistic competition. 
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(c) Positive spillover premium of Private 

























































Figure 4. Impact of FDI shock on output: spillover premium.   17
 (a)  Without spilllovers 
 
(b) With spillovers 
 
Figure 5. The impact of FDI shocks on the variety and scale of domestic enterprises. 
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Table 1. FDI to China by aggregated sectors in 2003 ($ million). 
Groups Sectors  FDI  % of 
total 
Resource manufacturing (Coal, petroleum and gas)  2,779    0.6   
Ferrous metals mining and dressing  0    0.0   
Nonferrous metals mining and dressing  0    0.0   
Mining* 
Mining of non-metal, other minerals, and other ores  0    0.0   
Food, beverage, and tobacco manufacturing  11,206    2.5   
Textile industry  22,591    5.1   
Garments and other fibre products  19,653    4.4   
Leather, furs, down and related products  14,344    3.2   
Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm fibre etc.  3,252    0.7   
Furniture  manufacturing  4,438   1.0  
Papermaking and paper products  9,807    2.2   
Printing and record medium reproduction  4,268    1.0   
Cultural, educational and sports goods  7,083    1.6   
Petroleum processing and coking  2,354    0.5   
Raw chemical materials and chemical products  21,518    4.9   
Medical and pharmaceutical products  7,864    1.8   
Chemical  fibre  3,595   0.8  
Rubber  products  5,966   1.3  
Plastic products  16,201    3.7   
Non-metal mineral products  13,615    3.1   
Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals  10,809    2.4   
Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals  5,836    1.3   
Metal products  16,635    3.8   
Ordinary machinery  12,906    2.9   
Special purpose equipment  10,128    2.3   
Transport equipment  19,622    4.4   
Electronic and electric products  52,490    11.9   
Manufacturing* 
Instruments, meters, cultural and office machinery  13,671    3.1   
Production of electric power, steam and hot water  4,549    1.0   
Production of gas  3,919    0.9   
Utilities* 
Production of tap water  2,244    0.5   
Agriculture  Farming, forestry, animal husbandry & fishing  8,278    1.9   
Construction  Construction  5,061   1.1  
Banking and 
Insurance  Banking  and  insurance  1,919   0.4  
Real Estate  Real estate  43,302    9.8   
Geological perambulation & water conservancy; transport, 
storage, post & telecommunication services; wholesale & 
retail trade & catering; social services; healthcare, sports & 
social welfare; education, culture, radio, films & television; 
scientific and technical services 
60,578   13.7  
Other services 
Public administration & other services  0    0.0   
Subtotal  All manufacturing  309,852  69.9 
Total  All sectors  442,481  100 
Note: (a) Categories marked * (MMU) can be further disaggregated by three types of ownership – FIE, 
SOE and Private. (b) Data source: Ministry of Commerce of China; China Industrial Economy Statistical 
Yearbook 2004 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2004). Compilations by the authors. 19
Table 2. Shares of output and value added of SOEs, FIEs, and Private enterprises in each 
sector of MMU (%). 
SOEs  FIEs  Private 
Sector Name 
Y VA  Y VA  Y VA 
Resource manufacturing (coal, petroleum, and gas)  29.5  13.6  5.2  3.9    65.3    82.5 
Ferrous metals mining and dressing  6.0  3.8  0.5  0.3    93.5    95.9 
Nonferrous metals mining and dressing  13.3  9.8  1.3  0.9    85.4    89.3 
Mining of non-metal, other minerals, and other ores  4.7  2.9  1.7  1.0    93.7    96.0 
Food, beverage, and tobacco manufacturing  21.0  19.7  34.8  31.8    44.2    48.4 
Textile  industry  8.2  9.7 24.8 24.2    67.0    66.1 
Garments and other fibre products  1.4  1.5  51.2  47.5    47.4    51.0 
Leather, furs, down and related products  0.9  1.3  60.1  72.5    39.0    26.1 
Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm fibre etc.  2.1  2.2  12.7  11.0    85.2    86.8 
Furniture  manufacturing  0.7  0.8 29.2 29.2    70.1    70.1 
Papermaking and paper products  5.7  5.6  30.5  28.8    63.9    65.6 
Printing and record medium reproduction  8.4  5.8  20.0  15.1    71.7    79.1 
Cultural, educational and sports goods  1.2  1.2  53.0  44.0    45.7    54.8 
Petroleum processing and coking  27.3  46.4  12.7  15.9    60.0    37.8 
Raw chemical materials and chemical products  15.1  17.5  24.0  25.5    60.9    57.0 
Medical and pharmaceutical products  15.9  12.0  29.7  28.4    54.4    59.7 
Chemical  fibre  11.8 16.0 38.2 39.6    50.0    44.4 
Rubber  products  11.1 11.8 39.0 39.8    49.8    48.5 
Plastic  products  1.5  1.8 30.5 32.1    68.0    66.1 
Non-metal  mineral  products  10.0  8.9 23.4 20.8    66.5    70.3 
Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals  24.6  27.6  6.8  5.9    68.5    66.5 
Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals  15.9  23.5  13.1  13.0    71.0    63.5 
Metal  products  3.0  3.7 31.3 31.9    65.7    64.5 
Ordinary  machinery  9.9 10.2 19.8 19.1    70.3    70.7 
Special  purpose  equipment  14.1 14.9 17.4 17.7    68.4    67.4 
Transport  equipment  25.8 28.8 43.7 45.2    30.4    26.0 
Electronic and electric products  6.4  8.5  81.5  78.7    12.1    12.8 
Instruments, meters, cultural and office machinery  5.5  6.3  63.3  51.4    31.1    42.3 
Production of electric power, steam and hot water  32.2  18.8  21.7  22.9    46.1    58.3 
Production  of  gas  22.5 32.2 27.7 14.0    49.9    53.8 
Production of tap water  29.5  17.2  3.9  3.0    66.7    79.8 
Note: “Y” and “VA” denote output and value added, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ estimation based on the data from National Bureau of Statistics of China (2006); Girma 
and Gong (2008).  20
Table 3. Industry-level data. 
Variables and coefficients  Symbols  Source  Years 
Value added  VA CIESY  2001-2003, 2005-2006 
Net fixed assets  K CIESY  2001-2003, 2005-2006 
Total employment  L CIESY  2001-2003, 2005-2006 
Input-output coefficients  γj,k; ηk,j I/O  2002 
Backward linkages  ∑ ∗ =
k
k k j j HZDS BL , γ   CIESY, I/O  2002 
Forward linkages  ∑ ∗ =
k
k j k j HZDS FL , η   CIESY, I/O  2002 
Horizontal demonstration  HZDS CIESY  2001-2003, 2005-2006 
Export concentration  EXCO CIESY  2001-2003, 2005-2006 
Note: CIESY is the China Industrial Economy Statistical Yearbook (2001-2003 and 2005-2006); I/O 
denotes China Input-output Table for 2002. Value added VA is deflated with an “ex-factory or wholesale price 
index”. Net fixed assets K are deflated with a “fixed asset investment price index”. Both indexes are obtained 
from China Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007). 
 
 
Table 4. Estimation of value added. 
Firm types  constant  K L Obs.  R
2 














Note: (a) Estimation of equation (2). (b) Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistically 
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. (c) “SOEs” stands for state-owned enterprises; “Private” 
denotes domestic private enterprises. 
 
 
Table 5. Estimation of productivity spillovers. 
Firm types  constant  BL  FL HZDS  EXCO  Obs.  R
2 






















Note: (a) Estimation of equation (3). (b) and (c): same as Table 4.   21
Table 6. Effects of FDI shocks to the benchmark economy. 




National output  5.9  6.8 
GDP 5.7  7.1 
Output of foreign-invested enterprises in MMU  20.8  14.9 
Output of domestic enterprises (SOEs + private) in MMU  -1.9  1.3 
-- SOEs  -0.6  1.9 
-- private enterprises  -2.3  1.2 
Output of non-MMU sectors (both foreign and domestic )  6.3  7.9 
Welfare (equivalent variation)  2.5  3.6 
Note: (a) “MMU” refers to mining, manufacturing, and utilities. (b) Elasticity of transformation of 





Table 7. Impacts of FDI inflow on enterprises of different ownerships in the top 5 recipient 
sectors in manufacturing (%) (without spillovers) 
   Export  Output  PL P K 
FIEs 46.1  39.9  7.7  -39.3 
SOEs -7.9  -4.0  -4.6  -1.3  Textile 
Private -8.8  -4.7  -5.4  -2.4 
FIEs 43.4  31.9  5.2  -34.4 
SOEs -5.9  -9.1  -9.0  -4.6  Garments 
Private -5.9  -9.1  -9.0  -4.6 
FIEs 41.6  32.7  6.5  -29.2 
SOEs -5.5  -3.2  -2.6  -0.5  Chemicals 
Private -6.0  -3.6  -3.0  -1.2 
FIEs 31.0  16.1  -2.2  -24.6 
SOEs 0.5  -4.6  -7.5  -2.3  Transport 
Private -0.9  -5.5  -8.5  -3.7 
FIEs 15.7  12.0  4.7  -12.5 
SOEs -5.2  -4.6  -0.8  0.0  Electronics 
Private -5.3  -4.7  -0.9  -0.1 
Note: PL and PK denote prices of labour and capital, respectively. 
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Table 8. Impact of FDI shock on national output with and without spillovers. 
Elasticity of transformation (L)  National output 
change (%)  0.1 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.8 
0.1 5.8 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1    6.1   
0.4 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0    6.0   
0.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 6.0    6.0   
1.0 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.9    5.9   
1.3 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8    5.9   
1.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8    5.8   
1.9 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8    5.8   
2.2 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7    5.8   




















2.8 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7    5.7   
0.1  7.7 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.4    8.4   
0.4  7.4 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.9 8.0 8.0 8.1    8.1   
0.7  7.2 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.7 7.7 7.8 7.8    7.9   
1.0  7.0 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.6    7.7   
1.3  6.9 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.5    7.5   
1.6  6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.3    7.4   
1.9  6.7 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.2    7.2   
2.2  6.7 6.8 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.1 7.1    7.1   

















2.8  6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.0    7.0   
0.1  1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3    2.3   
0.4  1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0    2.1   
0.7  1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9    1.9   
1.0  1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7    1.8   
1.3  1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6    1.6   
1.6  1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5    1.6   
1.9  1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5    1.5   
2.2  1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4    1.4   
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Table 9. Impact (%) of FDI shocks on SOEs (with spillovers). 
  FDI* BL  FL  HZDS  EXCO  NTFP  TFP Export Import Output  P 
Coal, petroleum and gas  0.6  7.8  7.6 6.8 9.6    6.7  0.8  -4.5 8.8 1.3  2.0 
Ferrous metals mining and dressing  0.0  7.2 18.0  -2.6  N.A.  11.2  1.2  -3.9  9.1  1.8 1.9 
Nonferrous metals mining and dressing  0.0  8.8 19.7  -2.0  -2.9   12.3  1.3  -6.4  15.4  3.5 3.4 
Mining of non-metal, other minerals, and other ores  0.0  9.6 13.9  -1.9  -2.5    9.6  0.8  -4.2  7.7  0.6 1.6 
Food, beverage, and tobacco manufacturing  2.5  4.7  3.0 0.8 1.4    1.4  0.2  -16.2  22.2 0.0  6.1 
Textile industry  5.1  14.0 12.6  16.6  21.0   11.8  2.6  0.6  7.8  2.0 0.4 
Garments and other fibre products  4.4  14.8  9.6 9.9 9.2    8.7  2.4 6.6  -7.5 0.3  -1.6 
Leather, furs, down and related products  3.2  9.5 10.4  10.2  10.5    7.1  2.8  5.7  4.0  4.2 -0.4 
Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm fibre etc.  0.7  13.3 13.9  17.4  23.6   13.3  1.6  -1.6  3.1  -0.6 0.3 
Furniture manufacturing  1.0  13.5 8.9 17.4 17.3    13.6  2.3  6.4  -7.6  -0.3  -1.7 
Papermaking and paper products  2.2  12.4 9.3 13.8  9.2   9.4  2.4  5.0  -3.0  -1.6  -2.2 
Printing and record medium reproduction  1.0  12.9 7.6 11.9  9.3    10.0  1.7  5.7  -8.3  -3.6  -3.1 
Cultural, educational and sports goods  1.6  10.5  8.7 9.8 8.5    7.6  2.3 4.3  -5.1 0.7  -0.9 
Petroleum processing and coking  0.5  7.2  11.0 6.6 8.6    7.2  0.7  -1.9 6.9 1.8  1.8 
Raw chemical materials and chemical products  4.9  10.7 10.9  13.3  16.5    9.4  2.2  2.6  3.5  1.7 -0.3 
Medical and pharmaceutical products  1.8  9.8 9.9 10.2 14.3   8.4  1.6  -1.6  -3.6  -5.2  -1.1 
Chemical fibre  0.8  11.0 11.8  10.1  12.8    8.1 2.5  9.4  -1.1  2.5 -2.0 
Rubber products  1.3  12.2 7.8 12.4 14.3   8.7  2.3  1.5  0.3  -0.8  -0.7 
Plastic products  3.7  12.7 7.0 14.1 12.3   8.5  2.5  7.7  -1.6  1.5  -1.8 
Non-metal mineral products  3.1  10.9 6.8 14.7 14.2    10.2  1.7  8.0  -10.7  -3.9  -3.9 
Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals  2.4  14.7 11.9  31.0  46.0   15.0 1.7  1.1  3.3  1.0 0.0 
Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals  1.3  16.1 6.8 24.4 38.3    10.4  2.1  0.4  7.5  2.8  0.6 
Metal products  3.8  15.8 7.8 13.7 15.4    10.2  2.2  9.2  -5.2  1.5  -1.9 
Ordinary machinery  2.9  9.9 8.2 12.9 13.6   8.7  1.7  3.9  -0.7  0.8  -0.7 
Special purpose equipment  2.3  10.7 12.9  19.7  14.8   13.0  1.8  7.9  -6.1  -0.3 -1.9 
Transport equipment  4.4  7.9  6.1 5.6 5.7    4.9  1.5 9.7  -7.1 0.4  -2.0 
Electronic and electric products  11.9  3.7  2.5 1.5 1.2    1.5  0.8 2.9 2.4 1.5  -0.3 
Instruments, meters, cultural and office machinery  3.1  5.6  7.9  11.4 8.4    6.2  2.7 1.4 3.1 0.8  -0.2 
Production of electric power, steam and hot water  1.0  6.2  11.4 1.4 0.1    4.5  0.8  -3.7  12.5 4.2  2.8 
Production of gas  0.9  9.3 10.2  20.8  51.1   14.2  2.3  7.7  -8.5  -1.6 -3.2 
Production of tap water  0.5  9.0 10.9 160.2  N.A.  26.3  2.9  -4.3  -8.2  -13.0 -3.3 
Note: (1) * FDI: percentage of total FDI in corresponding sectors; (2) BL: backward linkages; FL: forward linkages; HZDS: horizontal demonstration; EXCO: export 
concentration of FIEs; SPL: the percentage of TFP spillovers in total TFP; NTFP: the contribution of FDI productivity spillovers to total productivity; TFP: industry-level 
productivity; Export: export of SOEs. (3) (σK, σL) = (2.0, 0.5); (4) Some data are not available and marked “N.A.” because the initial values are zero. So it is not possible to 
calculate the percentage changes.  24
Table 10. Impact (%) of FDI shocks on private enterprises (with spillovers). 
  FDI  BL  FL  HZDS EXCO NTFP TFP  Export  Import Output P 
Coal, petroleum and gas  0.6  7.8 7.6  6.8  9.6    6.0  1.5  -3.5  8.8  2.1  1.9 
Ferrous metals mining and dressing  0.0  7.2 18.0  -2.6  N.A. 13.7  2.9  -1.9  9.1  3.5 1.8 
Nonferrous metals mining and dressing  0.0  8.8 19.7  -2.0  -2.9    14.1  3.2  -5.5  15.4  4.3 3.3 
Mining of non-metal, other minerals, and other ores  0.0  9.6 13.9  -1.9  -2.5    10.1  1.5  -2.9  7.7  1.6 1.5 
Food, beverage, and tobacco manufacturing  2.5  4.7 3.0  0.8  1.4    1.2  0.6 -14.6 22.2  1.4  6.0 
Textile industry  5.1  14.0 12.6  16.6  21.0   9.3  5.0  0.2  7.8  1.7 0.4 
Garments and other fibre products  4.4  14.8 9.6  9.9  9.2    5.1  2.9  6.3 -7.5  0.1  -1.6 
Leather, furs, down and related products  3.2  9.5 10.4  10.2  10.5   5.6  4.9  -6.1  4.0  -5.5 0.2 
Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm fibre etc.  0.7  13.3 13.9  17.4  23.6    11.7  3.6  -0.1  3.1  0.6 0.2 
Furniture manufacturing  1.0  13.5 8.9  17.4 17.3    10.9  3.9  6.1 -7.6 -0.6  -1.7 
Papermaking and paper products  2.2  12.4 9.3  13.8  9.2    6.6  4.9  6.8 -3.0 -0.3  -2.3 
Printing and record medium reproduction  1.0  12.9 7.6  11.9  9.3    7.8  2.7  11.6 -8.3  0.5  -3.5 
Cultural, educational and sports goods  1.6  10.5 8.7  9.8  8.5    5.6  2.9  5.3 -5.1  1.5  -1.0 
Petroleum processing and coking  0.5  7.2 11.0  6.6  8.6   6.5  1.8  -2.2  6.9  1.6 1.8 
Raw chemical materials and chemical products  4.9  10.7 10.9  13.3  16.5   7.1  4.5  2.3  3.5  1.5  -0.2 
Medical and pharmaceutical products  1.8  9.8 9.9  10.2 14.3    6.6  3.0  5.7 -3.6  0.2  -1.6 
Chemical fibre  0.8  11.0 11.8 10.1  12.8   5.5  5.0  5.1  -1.1  -0.6  -1.7 
Rubber products  1.3  12.2 7.8  12.4 14.3    5.9  4.2  0.4  0.3 -1.7  -0.6 
Plastic products  3.7  12.7 7.0  14.1 12.3    5.7  4.5  6.9 -1.6  0.9  -1.7 
Non-metal mineral products  3.1  10.9 6.8  14.7 14.2    7.9  3.5  13.2  -10.7 -0.2  -4.3 
Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals  2.4  14.7 11.9 31.0  46.0    12.9  4.0  2.6  3.3  2.1  -0.1 
Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals  1.3  16.1 6.8  24.4 38.3    7.0  4.3  -1.5  7.5  1.4  0.7 
Metal products  3.8  15.8 7.8  13.7 15.4    6.6  4.0  7.2 -5.2  0.0  -1.8 
Ordinary machinery  2.9  9.9 8.2  12.9 13.6    7.1  3.2  5.0 -0.7  1.6  -0.8 
Special purpose equipment  2.3  10.7 12.9  19.7  14.8    13.4  3.9  9.5  -6.1  0.8  -2.0 
Transport equipment  4.4  7.9 6.1  5.6  5.7    3.1  2.3  7.5 -7.1 -1.0  -1.9 
Electronic and electric products  11.9  3.7 2.5  1.5  1.2    0.7  1.0  2.2  2.4  1.0  -0.3 
Instruments, meters, cultural and office machinery  3.1  5.6 7.9  11.4  8.4    7.2  5.0  3.3  3.1  2.5  -0.2 
Production of electric power, steam and hot water  1.0  6.2 11.4  1.4  0.1   3.4  1.5  -5.0  12.5  3.0 2.9 
Production of gas  0.9  9.3 10.2  20.8  51.1    12.0  5.8  0.9  -8.5  -6.8  -2.8 
Production of tap water  0.5  9.0 10.9  160.2  N.A. 40.7  8.1  21.3  -8.2  4.8  -5.1 
Note: same as Table 9.  25
Table 11. Effects of an FDI shock under monopolistic competition. 
    % change  Perfect 
Competition  N=50 N=10  N=5 
Total output  6.8 6.9 7.2 7.5 
GDP  7.1 7.2 7.8 8.3 
welfare  3.6 3.8 4.4 5.0 
Output  1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 
Variety  n.a. 0.8 0.3  -0.1  SOEs 
Scale  n.a. 0.2 0.5  0.75 
Output  1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 
Variety  n.a. 0.6 -0.2 -0.4  Private 
Scale  n.a. 0.4 1.0 1.2 
Output  14.9 15.0 15.3 15.6 
Variety  n.a. 15.1 13.3 12.5 
With spillovers 
FIEs 
Scale  n.a. 0.7 2.0 2.7 
Total output  5.6 5.7 6.0 6.2 
GDP  5.6 5.7 6.2 6.6 
welfare  2.5 2.6 3.1 3.6 
Output  1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Variety  n.a. 0.2 -0.2 -0.4  SOEs 
Scale  n.a. 0.1 0.4 0.6 
Output  0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Variety  n.a. -0.9 -1.5 -1.7  Private 
Scale  n.a. 0.4 0.9 1.1 
Output  15.5 15.6 15.9 16.3 
Variety  n.a. 15.8 14.0 13.2 
Without spillovers 
FIEs 
Scale  n.a. 0.7 2.0 2.6 
Total output  1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 
GDP  1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 
welfare  1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 
Output  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Variety  n.a. 0.6 0.4 0.4  SOEs 
Scale  n.a. 0.0 0.1 0.2 
Output  1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 
Variety  n.a. 1.5 1.3 1.3  Private 
Scale  n.a. 0.0 0.1 0.2 
Output  -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 
Variety  n.a. -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 
Spillover premium 
FIEs 
Scale  n.a. 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Note: (a) Elasticity of transformation of capital and labour (τK, τL) = (2.0, 0.5). (b) “n.a.” means that the 
variables are not applicable for perfect competition.  26
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